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Abstract
Rational inference relations were introduced by Lehmann and Magidor
as the ideal systems for drawing conclusions from a conditional base. How-
ever, there has been no simple characterization of these relations, other
than its original representation by preferential models. In this paper, we
shall characterize them with a class of total preorders of formulas by im-
proving and extending Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson’s results for expectation
inference relations. A second representation is application-oriented and is
obtained by considering a class of consequence operators that grade sets
of defaults according to our reliance on them. The finitary fragment of
this class of consequence operators has been employed by recent default
logic formalisms based on maxiconsistency.
Keywords: foundations of knowledge representation, nonmonotonic rea-
soning, nonmonotonic consequence relations, orderings of formulas.
1 Introduction
A recent breakthrough in nonmonotonic logic is the beginning of study of non-
monotonic consequence through postulates for abstract nonmonotonic conse-
quence relations, using Gentzen-like context-sensitive sequents ([6], [14], [12]).
The outcome of this research turns out to be valuable in at least two ways
• it provides a sufficiently general axiomatic framework for comparing and
classifying nonmonotonic formalisms, and
∗Work supported by Training through Research Contract No. ERBFMBICT950324 be-
tween the European Community and Universita` degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”.
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• it gave rise to new, simpler, and better behaved systems for nonmonotonic
reasoning, such as cumulative ([6]), preferential ([12]), and rational ([13])
inference relations.
It is unfortunate that these new inference relations enjoy only one, semanti-
cal, representation; that of preferential models ([24]). We have that preferential ,
preferential transitive, and preferential modular or ranked models characterize
cumulative, preferential and rational inference relations, respectively ([12], [13]).
An additional second-order constraint must be imposed on these models, called
stoppering or smoothness . However, this modeling is insufficient because in
order to employ the above inference relations, one must be able to generate
them. This is crucial when we want to design a system that reasons using the
above inference relations. In such a case, one comes up with a set of rules or
defaults that one wants to apply, imposes a prioritization on them, and pro-
vides a mechanism which ensures that answers are derived according to these
inference relations. This is exactly the proof-theoretic approach expressed by
default logic. However, no similar proof-theoretic notion is provided in the above
framework.
In this paper, we offer two new, alternative representations for rational infer-
ence. The first representation is algebraic and obtained through a simple class
of orderings of formulas, called rational orderings. The second representation
is proof-theoretic and obtained through a class of consequence operators based
on the way we handle defaults, called ranked consequence operators . Moreover,
a correspondence result between these classes is established.
The first link between nonmonotonic inference relations and a class of or-
derings of formulas was given by Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson in [7]. However, the
nonmonotonic system defined by an ordering of formulas is not one of the pre-
viously mentioned systems, but a translation of the well-known belief revision
AGM axioms ([1]) into nonmonotonic reasoning, called expectation inference
relations. Expectation inference relations are rational inference relations to-
gether with a rule called Consistency Preservation. Moreover, Ga¨rdenfors and
Makinson’s representation of expectation inference relations with orderings of
formulas is not appropriate, in the sense that the correspodence is not bijective.
(Two orderings of formulas can generate the same inference relation.) So, two
questions remain open. Namely,
• is there a way to generate one of the independently motivated nonmono-
tonic inference relations (cumulative, preferential, rational) with a class of
orderings of formulas?, and
• can the correspondence be bijective?
We answer affirmatively both questions for rational inference. Our approach
is the following. We study the rule of Consistency Preservation and, by giving
it a precise syntactic characterization, show that its role is insignificant in the
context of preferential reasoning. Drawing from this intuition, we introduce new
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defining conditions relating the classes of orderings of formulas and nonmono-
tonic consequence relations and show that Ga¨rdenfors-Makinson orderings are
in bijective correspondence with rational inference. Moreover, we introduce a
smaller class of orderings, which, under our translation, is in bijective corre-
spondence with the Ga¨rdenfors-Makinson expectation inference relations. This
is how the first representation result for rational inference is obtained. This
result adds to a long tradition of defining nonmonotonic logics with orderings
of formulas ([4], [19], [7], [20]).
The above representation result is more “constructive” than the semantical
completeness of preferential models. However, rational orderings must have
a concise, constructive representation. To this end, we encode a natural way
of applying defaults into a new class of consequence relations, called ranked
consequence operators . Each member of this class generates a rational ordering,
and conversely, hence the class of ranked consequence relations coincides with
that of rational inference. Also, we show how previous default logic systems in
the literature ([17], [18]) reduce to our framework.
The above results pave the way towards a study of nonmonotonicity through
orderings of formulas, allow us to translate previous work in belief revision into
the context of nonmonotonic reasoning, and provide a framework for designing
default systems obeying rational inference.
The plan of this paper as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce the
relations under study, explain the rule of Consistency Preservation, and provide
a characterization for this rule. In Section 3, we introduce the orderings, their
translations and our first representation theorem. In Section 4, we introduce
ranked consequence operators and our second representation theorem. In Sec-
tion 5, we show how one can generate a ranked consequence operator given a
prioritized family of sets of defaults and, in Section 6, conclude. A preliminary
version of the first half of this paper appeared in [10]. Results from the second
half were announced in [9].
2 Shifting underlying entailment
Before going to the main result of this section, we shall make a brief introduction
to the nonmonotonic consequence relations under study. Assume a languageL of
propositional constants closed under the boolean connectives ∨ (disjunction), ∧
(conjunction), ¬ (negation) and→ (implication). We shall use greek letters α, β,
γ, etc. for propositional variables. We shall also use α∼ β , read as “α normally
entails β”, to denote the nonmonotonic consequence relation (∼ ⊆ L × L).
Before we present the first set of rules for ∼ , we need a symbol for a classical-
like entailment. We shall use ⊢. The relation ⊢ need not be that of classical
propositional logic. We require that ⊢ includes classical propositional logic,
satisfies compactness (i.e., if X ⊢ β then there exists a finite subset Y of X such
that Y ⊢ β)1, the deduction theorem (i.e., X,α ⊢ β if and only if X ⊢ α → β)
and disjunction in premises (i.e., if X,α ⊢ β and X, γ ⊢ β then X,α ∨ γ ⊢ β).
1We write X,α ⊢ β for X ∪ {α} ⊢ β.
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Table 1: Rules for Preferential, Rational and Expectation Inference
α ⊢ β
α∼ β
(Supraclassicality)
α ⊢ β β ⊢ α α∼ γ
β ∼ γ
(Left Logical Equivalence)
α∼ β ⊢ β → γ
α∼ γ
(Right Weakening)
α∼ β α∼ γ
α∼ β ∧ γ
(And)
α∼ β α ∧ β ∼ γ
α∼ γ
(Cut)
α∼ β α∼ γ
α ∧ β ∼ γ
(Cautious Monotonicity)
α∼ γ β ∼ γ
α ∨ β ∼ γ
(Or)
α 6∼ ¬β α∼ γ
α ∧ β ∼ γ
(Rational Monotonicity)
α∼⊥
α ⊢ ⊥
(Consistency Preservation)
The reader will notice that these are the only properties we make use of in the
subsequent proofs. We shall denote the consequences of α with Cn(α) and C(α)
under ⊢ and ∼ , respectively.
The rules mentioned in the following are presented in Table 1. For a mo-
tivation of these rules, see [12] and [15]. (The latter serves as an excellent
introduction to nonmonotonic consequence relations.)
Definition 1 Following ([12], [13], [7]), we shall say that a relation ∼ on L
is an inference relation (based on ⊢) if it satisfies Supraclassicality, Left Logical
Equivalence, Right Weakening, and And. We shall call an inference relation ∼
preferential if it satisfies, in addition, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, and Or. We
shall call an inference relation ∼ rational if it is preferential and satisfies, in
addition, Rational Monotonicity. Finally, we shall say that ∼ is an expecta-
tion inference relation (based on ⊢) if it is a rational and satisfies, in addition,
Consistency Preservation.
The most controversial of these rules is Rational Monotonicity, which, more-
over, is non-Horn. For a plausible counterexample, see [26].
Expectation inference relations correspond to the so-called AGM postulates
for belief revision ([1]), as it was shown in [16], and only differ from rational
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relations in that they satisfy the following rule, called Consistency Preservation:
α∼⊥
α ⊢ ⊥
where ⊢ is classical entailment. Consistency Preservation says that a logically
not false belief cannot render our set of beliefs inconsistent. This makes a dif-
ference between the two classes, in the following sense. Using rational inference,
I can rely on an inference such as β ∼⊥, where β is the statement “I am the
Queen of England”. On the other hand, expectation inference would not allow
that, since, even if I am certain I am not the Queen of England, one could think
a world where I could have been. This becomes more important if, instead of
a belief set, one considers a conditional base. For example, consider a database
for air-traffic. The statement “two airplanes are scheduled to arrive at the same
time and land on the same place” should infer inconsistency on this database,
although it is not a falsity. More examples can be drawn from physical laws.
This means that rational inference is the logic of “hard constraints”, that is of
statements (not necessarily tautologies) I cannot revise without deconstructing
the whole inference mechanism. This is not admitted in expectation inference:
all statements are allowed to be revised apart from tautologies (or whatever is
a consequence of the empty set under the underlying entailment).
In [16] and [15], it was observed that preferential entailment satisfies a weaker
form of consistency preservation: there exists a consequence operation ⊢′ with
⊢⊆⊢′⊆ ∼ such that ∼ satisfies Consistency Preservation with respect to ⊢′.
This was proved by semantical arguments.
In the following theorem, we make this property more precise by express-
ing it in syntactic terms. We show that the required underlying consequence
operation retains the properties of the initial one, as it only differs on the set
of assumptions. Therefore, the relation between an expectation and a rational
inference relation is that of a logic with its theory.
For the proof of Theorem 3, we shall make use of the following rules (derived
in any preferential inference relation).
Lemma 2 In any preferential inference relation, the following rules hold
1.
α∼ β β ∼ α α∼ γ
β ∼ γ
(Reciprocity)
2.
α ∧ β ∼ γ
α∼ β → γ
(S)
3.
α∼⊥
α ∧ β ∼⊥
4.
α ∧ β ∼⊥
α∼ ¬β
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5.
α ∨ β ∼⊥
α∼⊥
Proof. Rules 1, 2 and 3 were introduced and shown to be derived in a preferential
relation in [12]. For 4, suppose α ∧ β ∼⊥. Applying S, we get α∼ β → ⊥ and,
by Right weakening, we conclude 4. For 5, suppose α ∨ β ∼⊥. Then, by 3, we
get (α ∨ β) ∧ α∼⊥ and, by Left Logical Equivalence, we conclude 5.
Theorem 3 Let ∼ be a preferential inference relation based on ⊢. Then ∼
is a preferential inference relation based on ⊢′ that satisfies the Consistency
Preservation rule, where
α ⊢′ β iff Γ, α ⊢ β,
and
Γ = {¬γ : γ ∼⊥}.
Proof. We must prove that ∼ satisfies Supraclassicality, Left Logical Equiva-
lence, Right Weakening and Consistency Preservation with respect to ⊢′. The
rest of the rules are already satisfied since they do not involve an underlying
consequence relation.
First notice that Consistency Preservation is immediate by definition of ⊢′.
For Supraclassicality, suppose α ⊢′ γ then Γ, α ⊢ γ. By compactness of ⊢,
there exist β1, . . . , βn ∈ L such that β1 ∼⊥, . . . , βn ∼⊥ and ¬β1, . . . ,¬βn, α∼ γ.
By repeated applications of Or, we get β1 ∨ · · · ∨ βn ∼⊥. Let β = β1 ∨ · · · ∨ βn,
then β ∼⊥ and α∧¬β ⊢ γ. By Supraclassicality of ∼ on ⊢, we have α∧¬β ∼ γ.
By Lemma 2.3, we have α ∧ β ∼⊥, so, by Lemma 2.4, we have α∼ ¬β. Using
Cut, we get α∼ γ, as desired.
For Left Logical Equivalence, suppose α∼ γ, α ⊢′ β, and β ⊢′ α, i.e. Γ, α ⊢ β
and Γ, β ⊢ α. By compactness, there exist δ1, δ2 ∈ L such that α∼¬δ1, α∼¬δ2,
α ∧ δ1 ⊢ β, and β ∧ δ2 ⊢ α. As above, we have α∼ β and β ∼ α. Therefore, by
Lemma 2.1, we get β ∼ γ, as desired.
Coming to Right Weakening, suppose α∼ β and β ⊢′ γ, i.e. there exists
δ ∈ L such that α∼¬δ and β ∧ ¬δ ∼ γ. By And, we have α∼ β ∧ ¬δ, so, using
Right Weakening of ∼ on ⊢, we get α∼ γ, as desired.
Notice that the result applies to rational inference relations, as well, since
the latter are preferential, by definition. We interpret the above result as fol-
lows. Once we strengthen the underlying entailment, rational inference will
become an expectation inference and, therefore, can be treated as such. It also
implies that the logic of hard and soft constraints is basically the same, their
only difference being what we consider a consequence of the underlying propo-
sitional entailment. Hard constraints are just taking a place in our belief set as
“guarded” as that of, say, tautologies. Whatever remains is subject to revision,
and hence a soft constraint.
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3 Rational inference and orderings
Now that we established the correspondence between rational and expectation
inference relations, we shall extend it to a particularly attractive characteriza-
tion of the latter with orderings of formulas. We shall first review Ga¨rdenfors-
Makinson’s results and then present our own.
The intuition behind ordering-based formalisms is common in works on belief
revision, possibilistic logic, and decision theory. We order sentences according
to our expectations. A relation “α < β” is interpreted as “β is expected more
than α”, or “α is more surprising than β”, or “β is more possible than α”.
One can treat such an ordering as a primary notion; this is the approach of
this paper. However, in case of rational orderings, one can show that such an
ordering induces a function from the extensions of formulas to the unit interval.
This function induces a possibility measure on the extensions of formulas (see
[2]). A possibility measure is a “weak” probability measure on these extensions.
Roughly, it replaces addition with maximisation. Although the connections with
probability are not clear yet (see [3], [25]), probability measures seem especially
suited for modeling cases under uncertainty. Further, a possibility measure
arises naturally out of a database. Zadeh’s theory for approximate reasoning
([28]) provides a method for turning available information of a certain form
(“fuzzy” database) into a possibility measure and, therefore, gives rise to a
rational ordering of sentences.
We find that, by a logical point of view, orderings correspond to prioritiza-
tion. We prefer a proof-theoretic reading, made more explicit in Section 4, “α
is more defeasible than β” or “α has lower priority than β”. A notion of proof
is developed in Section 4 based on this prioritization and justifies the use of
rational orderings without appealing to some probabilistic intuition.
Definition 4 [7] A rational ordering is a relation ≤ on L which satisfies the
following properties:
1. If α ≤ β and β ≤ γ, then α ≤ γ (Transitivity),
2. If α ⊢ β, then α ≤ β (Dominance),
3. α ≤ α ∧ β or β ≤ α ∧ β (Conjunctiveness).
The original name of these orderings was expectation orderings. However, we
shall see that this name is not justifiable, since expectation inference relations
correspond to a smaller class of orderings (see Definition 2).
One can easily derive from the above properties that a rational ordering
satisfies
1. connectivity, i.e. α ≤ β or β ≤ α, and
2. either α ≤ β, for all β ∈ L, or ¬α ≤ β, for all β ∈ L.
We should mention that the above properties of rational relations are not
new. It is not easy to assign credits, but they have appeared in works in belief
revision ([7]), possibilistic logic ([3]), [4]), fuzzy logic ([27]), theory of evidence
([23]), and economics ([22]) (see [7] for a historical reference).
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Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson define the following maps between the class of
expectation inference relations and rational orderings.
Definition 5 [7] Given a rational ordering ≤ and an expectation inference
relation ∼ , then define a consequence relation ∼ ′ and an ordering ≤′ as follows
(C) α∼ ′γ iff either α ⊢ γ
or there is a β ∈ L such that α ∧ β ⊢ γ and ¬α < β.
(O) α ≤′ β iff either ⊢ α ∧ β or ¬(α ∧ β) 6∼ α.
We shall also denote ∼ ′ and ≤′ with C(≤) and O(∼ ), respectively.
Condition (O) is critical and due to Rott ([21]). Now, one can prove the
following.
Theorem 6 [7] Given a rational ordering ≤ and an expectation inference rela-
tion ∼ , then C(≤) is an expectation inference relation and O( ∼ ) is a rational
ordering. Moreover, we have ∼ = C(O(∼ )).
This theorem, although it exhibits the first connection between some class
of nonmonotonic consequence relations and orderings of formulas, has two dis-
advantages. First, the way it achieves consistency preservation is ad hoc. If
that was not the case, then the condition (C) would be inappropriate, since, in
the first part, it refers explicitly to the underlying entailment2. Second, it fails
to show an isomorphism between the class of expectation inference relations
and that of rational orderings, that is ≤= O(C(≤)). If the second was not the
case, then the condition (O) would use only the expectation inference relation
to construct the ordering. Consider the following example.
Example 7 Let D1 = {{⊤}, { ⊤, α}} and D2 = {{α}}. Now define orderings
on L as follows
β ≤1 γ iff A ⊢ β implies A ⊢ γ, for all A ∈ D1.
Similarly, for D2 and ≤2. We have that ≤1 6=≤2, and by Proposition 19, the
orderings are rational. However, they generate the same expectation inference
relation, using (O).
Drawing from the above intuitions and Theorem 3, we define
Definition 8 Given a rational ordering ≤ and a rational inference relation ∼ ,
then define a consequence relation ∼ ′ and an ordering ≤′ as follows
(C) α∼ ′γ iff either β ≤ ¬α, for all β ∈ L,
or there is a β ∈ L such that α ∧ β ⊢ γ and ¬α < β.
(O) α ≤′ β iff either ¬(α ∧ β)∼⊥ or ¬(α ∧ β) 6∼ α.
We shall also denote ∼ ′ and ≤′ with C(≤) and O(∼ ), respectively.
For Theorem 10, we need the following lemma.
2However, the second part should remain the same since we do not mind having a few more
consequences, as long as, the rules which govern the underlying entailment do not change.
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Lemma 9 Let ≤ and ∼ be a rational ordering and inference relation, respec-
tively. Then
1. If α∼ ⊥ then β ≤′ ¬α, for all β ∈ L, where ≤′= O(∼ ).
2. If β ≤ ¬α, for all β ∈ L, then α∼ ′⊥, where ∼ ′ = C(≤).
3. ¬α < α→ γ iff {β : ¬α < β} ⊢ α→ γ.
Now, everything falls into place.
Theorem 10 Given a rational ordering ≤ and a rational inference relation ∼ ,
then C(≤) is a rational inference relation and O(∼ ) is a rational ordering.
Moreover, we have ∼ = C(O(∼ )) and ≤= O(C(≤)).
Now, if rational orderings are in adjunction with rational inference relations,
what is the class of orderings which corresponds to expectation inference rela-
tions? For that, observe that by Lemma 9, hard constraints are positioned on
the top of rational orderings. So, it is enough to keep exclusively this place
for the consequences of the empty set and add this as a condition to rational
orderings.
Definition 11 An expectation ordering is a rational ordering which satisfies,
in addition, the following property:
If β ≤ α, for all β ∈ L, then ⊢ α.
Now, using the same defining conditions (C) and (O), we can state the
improved characterization theorem for expectation inference relations.
Theorem 12 Given an expectation ordering ≤ and an expectation inference
relation ∼ , then C(≤) is an expectation inference relation and O(∼ ) is an
expectation ordering. Moreover, we have ∼ = C(O(∼ )) and ≤= O(C(≤)).
Theorems 10 and 12 can now be used for giving new straightforward proofs
for the characterization of rational inference with ranked preferential models
(Theorem 3.12 of [13]) and expectation inference with nice preferential models
(Theorems 3.8 and 3.9 of [7]). These proofs will appear elsewhere.
4 Ranked consequence operators
First, a word about the plan of this section. We introduce the notion of ranked
consequence operation without referring to an underlying entailment (Defini-
tion 4). The reason for such a definition is that we can motivate ranked con-
sequence operators independently of nonmonotonic reasoning. Then we define
a smaller class based on an underlying entailment (Definition 4) and show that
this class characterize rational inference relations. The same constraints we
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assumed for a language L and an entailment ⊢ in Section 2 continue to hold
here.
Think of a reasoner whose beliefs are ordered accordingly to their defeasi-
bility. Beliefs which are less likely to be defeated come before beliefs which are
more likely to be defeated. For instance “Birds fly” will come after “Penguins
do not fly” (since the former has more exceptions) and “Mary is married” might
come before “Mary is married with children” (since the latter is stronger). There
is a natural way to attach a consequence operator to this belief prioritization.
Definition 13 Let 〈I,<〉 be a linear ordering, and {Ai}i∈I be an upward chain
of sets of formulas such that Ai ⊆ Aj iff i ≤ j. Define the following consequence
operators (one for each i ∈ I):
∼ iβ iff β ∈ Ai,
α∼ iβ iff ¬α 6∈ Ai and α→ β ∈ Ai.
Now let
α∼ β iff either α∼ iβ, for some i ∈ I,
or ∼ i¬α, for all i ∈ I.
The consequence operator ∼ will be called ranked consequence operator
(induced by {Ai}i∈I).
First, note that Ai’s are not necessarily deductively closed. Second, notice
that, unless we add the last part of the definition of ∼ , we do not provide
for formulas α, where ¬α ∈ Ai, for all i ∈ I. In order to have α∼⊥, there
must either be an Ai such that ¬α 6∈ Ai and α → ⊥ ∈ Ai, or ¬α ∈ Ai, for
all i ∈ I. This means that if our beliefs can accommodate a context where
α holds, then we use the part of the ordering that remains consistent after
adding α. Therefore the Ai’s which contain both ¬α and α are irrelevant to the
consequence operator.
Indices assign grades of relying on the set of consequences as the next ex-
ample, formalizing omniscience, shows.
Example 14 Let 〈ω,<〉 be the set of natural numbers with the usual order.
Now let ⊢ be the classical consequence relation and let A1 be some set of formulas
of propositional logic. Let
A2 = {φ | is provable in one step from A1},
and, inductively,
An = {φ | is provable in less than n− 1 steps from A1}.
Notice that if A1 is consistent and ∼ is the ranked consequence operator
defined through {Ai}i∈ω then
α∼ β iff A1, α ⊢ β,
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where ⊢ is the classical consequence operator of propositional calculus. Note
that if A1 is inconsistent, then α entails all formulas which are provable from A1
with less steps than ¬α, i.e., before we realize inconsistency. Now, if A1 is the
set of all tautologies or, better, an axiomatization of them then ∼ is exactly
the classical consequence operator.
It is clear that the above representation is syntax-based, i.e. depends on the
particular representation of Ai’s. The case where the sets of formulas Ai are
closed under consequence is the one we shall deal with in this paper. Doing that
is like being logically omniscient; we do not assign any cost to derivations using
⊢.
We shall now give a definition of ranked consequence operator using an
underlying entailment. In case the Ai’s are closed under consequence, it coin-
cides with the original definition (by replacing the set belonging relation ∈ with
proposition entailment ⊢).
Definition 15 A ranked consequence operator ∼ based on ⊢ induced by a
chain of sets {Bi}i∈I under inclusion is defined as follows:
We first define a set of consequence operators ∼ i (one for each i ∈ I):
α∼ iβ iff Bi 6⊢ ¬α and Bi, α ⊢ β.
Note that we denote ⊤∼ iβ with ∼ iβ. We can now let
α∼ β iff either α∼ iβ, for some i ∈ I,
or ∼ i¬α, for all i ∈ I.
We shall use 〈{Bi}i∈I ,⊢〉 to denote this operator.
Notice that we can have both 6⊢ α and ∼ i¬α, for all i. This translates to
the fact that α can be true in some possible world but it is unthinkable for us to
include it in our beliefs. The above mechanism treats such a case as an instance
of a hard constraint: such an α implies falsehood.
Again notice that unless Bi ⊢ ¬α, for all i ∈ I, we cannot derive falsity
from α. The reason is that, in those cases, we are able to form a context based
on α (a chain of sets of formulas which prove α) which is consistent. Again,
the inconsistent Bi’s are irrelevant to the consequence operator. The following
proposition allows us to assume that the ordering is complete, that is it has all
meets and joins, and amounts essentially to Lewis’ assumption or smoothness
property of preferential models.
Proposition 16 A ranked consequence operator ∼ based on ⊢ is induced by a
chain of sets of formulas if and only if it is induced by the closure of this chain
under arbitrary unions and intersections.
This result has the following significance: it allows an assignment of a rank
to an assertion of the form α∼ β. Suppose that α∼ β holds. If ∼ i¬α for all
i ∈ I does not hold, then the set I
α∼ β = {i : 6∼ i¬α and α∼ iβ} is not empty.
Moreover, it is connected. Now, it is easy to see that, in the completion of the
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chain, this set has a least element (because it is closed under intersection) and a
greatest element (because it is closed under unions). Let i1 and i2 be the indices
of the least and greatest elements, respectively. The rank of the assertion α∼ β
is i1 and its range [i1, i2]. In case ∼ i¬α, for all i ∈ I, then set the rank of
α∼ β to 0 and its range to [0, l], where 0 and l are the indices of least and the
greatest element of the linear order, respectively. In case of an assertion ∼ β,
observe that its range is of the form [i, l], where l is the index of the greatest
element of the linear ordering.
Finally, notice that a ranked consequence operator is not necessarily mono-
tonic.
Example 17 Let B1 = {α} and B2 = {α,¬β}. We have α∼¬β because
¬α 6∈ Cn(B2) and α → ¬β ∈ Cn(B2). But we also have that α ∧ β 6∼ ¬β
because ¬(α ∧ β) 6∈ Cn(B1).
Now, it is interesting to ask what kind of properties a ranked consequence
operator satisfies. It turns out that each ranked consequence operator gives rise
to a rational inference relation. Although one can show it directly, we define
the rational orderings induced by such operators.
Definition 18 Given a ranked consequence operator, let
α ≤ β iff Bi ⊢ α implies Bi ⊢ β, for all i ∈ I.
and call ≤ the ordering induced by the ranked consequence operator ∼ .
We, now, have the following
Proposition 19 An ordering induced by a ranked consequence operator is ra-
tional. Moreover, C(≤) = ∼ .
We have immediately the following.
Corollary 20 A ranked consequence operator is a rational inference relation.
The other direction of the above theorem holds, too. We should only show,
given a rational ordering, how to generate a total order of sets of formulas.
To this end, we shall define a chain of sets {Ai}i∈I which generates a ranked
consequence operator ∼ equal to C(≤). Let ∼ be the equivalence relation
induced by ≤ (a rational ordering is a preorder). The equivalence classes will be
denoted by αˆ (where α ∈ αˆ). It is also clear that the set of equivalence classes
is linearly ordered. Now, for each α ∈ L, let
Aαˆ = {β : α ≤ β}.
Note here that, by Dominance, the sets Aαˆ are closed under consequence. More-
over, we have Aαˆ ⊆ Aβˆ iff β ≤ α. Now, generate a ranked consequence operator
∼ as in Definition 4. This ranked consequence operator turns out to be equal
to the one generated by the rational order. So, we have the following.
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Theorem 21 A rational inference relation is a ranked consequence operator.
The proof of the above theorem shows that a rational ordering can be defined
by a chain of sets which induces a ranked consequence operator and conversely.
However, the same rational ordering can be induced by two different ranked
consequence operators. This should hardly be surprising, as ranked consequence
operators play the role of axiomatizing a nonmonotonic “theory”, that is, a
rational inference. Moreover,
• ranked consequence operators are proof-theoretic in their motivation, and
therefore closer to what we want to describe by a rational inference rela-
tion, and
• a ranked consequence operator assigns ranks to assertions as well as to
formulas therefore grading the whole process of inference.
We showed that rational and expectation inference relations are exactly the
same class of consequence relations if we allow the underlying propositional
entailment to “vary”. However fixing ⊢, is it possible to tell if a ranked conse-
quence operator satisfies Consistency Preservation? The answer is affirmative,
for a formula α infers inconsistency (α∼⊥) if and only if its negation is a con-
sequence of the first element of the chain which induces the ranked consequence
operator (as a corollary of Proposition 16, a first element always exists). To see
that, suppose α∼⊥, then, by definition, we must have ∼ i¬α, for all i ∈ I, and
for that it is enough that the first element of the chain implies ¬α.
5 Rational default systems
In this section, we shall see how one can design a ranked consequence operator.
Suppose we are given a number of sets of (normal, without prerequisites) de-
faults in a linear well-founded prioritization. Moreover, and this is an important
assumption for rational inference, we are asked to, either apply the whole set, or
not apply it at all. Let the set of sets of defaults be D = {Ai}i∈I , where 〈I,<〉
is a well-founded linear strict order, and Ai is preferred from Aj whenever i < j.
The are two ways to read this preference.
• The first way is a strict one: if you cannot add Ai to your set of theorems
(that is, you derive inconsistency by adding Ai) then you cannot add Aj ,
for all Aj less preferred from Ai.
• the other is liberal : if you cannot add Ai to your set of theorems, then
you can add Aj , where Aj is less preferred from Ai, provided you cannot
add Ak, where Ak is more preferred than Aj .
To illustrate this, consider the following example.
Example 22 Let D = {A1, A2, A3}, where A1 = {α → β}, A2 = {¬β}, and
A3 = {β → γ}. Assume α. Following the strict interpretation, we can only
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infer β, from A1. With the liberal interpretation, we can also infer γ, since we
are allowed to add A3, and cannot add A2 that leads to a contradiction.
It turns out that those readings are equivalent. Not in the sense that the
same set of sets of defaults generate the same consequences, but that a strict
extension of a family of sets of defaults can be reduced to a liberal extension of
another family of sets of defaults, and conversely. It can be easily shown that
strict and liberal extensions of families of sets of defaults are instances of rational
consequence operators and, therefore, rational. In particular, Proposition 19
gives us a way to construct the rational orderings of such default systems.
Given D = {Ai}i∈I , where 〈I,<〉 is well-founded, define the following strict
ordering between non-empty subsets of I:
K < L iff there exists i ∈ I such that a. i ∈ K but i 6∈ L, and
b. for all j < i, j ∈ K iff j ∈ L.
It can be shown that < is linear. Now, let AK =
⋂
K≤L Cn(
⋃
i∈LAi).
Definition 23 Let α ∈ L and D = {Ai}i∈I , where 〈I,<〉 is a total strict order,
and Ai ⊆ L, for all i ∈ I. The strict extension E
s
D(α) of α with respect to D is
defined as follows
EsD(α) =
⋃
{Esi : E
s
i is consistent},
where Esi = Cn({α} ∪
⋃
j≤iAj). The liberal extension E
l
D(α) of α with respect
to D is defined as follows
ElD(α) =
⋃
{ElL : E
l
L is consistent},
where ElL = Cn({α} ∪
⋃
K≤LAK).
Thus the liberal extension of D = {Ai}i∈I is the strict extension of D
′ =
{AK}K∈P(I)∗. For the other direction, the strict extension of D = {Ai}i∈I
coincides with the liberal extension of D′′ = {Ci}i∈I , where Ci =
⋃
j≤iAi.
So, it is enough to construct the ranked consequence operator for the strict
extension of D = {Ai}i∈I . But this is easily achieved. Consider 〈{Bi}i∈I , ∼ 〉,
where Bi = E
s
i .
Thus, strict and liberal extensions of prioritized sets of set of formulas are
rational. The above definition, together with Proposition 19, gives us a way to
construct the rational orderings of such default systems. Given a prioritized set
D = {Ai}i∈I then the rational ordering of its strict extension is
α ≤sD β iff
⋃
j≤i
Aj ⊢ α implies
⋃
j≤i
Aj ⊢ β, for all i ∈ I.
The rational ordering of its liberal extension is
α ≤lD β iff
⋃
K≤L
AK ⊢ α implies
⋃
K≤L
AK ⊢ β, for all L ∈ P(I)
∗.
Assuming a finite language, sets of formulas, intersections, and unions of
them correspond to conjunctions, disjunctions, and conjunctions, respectively.
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A study of the above default systems under the assumption of finite language,
has been carried already in the context of belief revision (therefore, assuming
consistency preservation, in addition to finite language), by Nebel ([17], [18]).
Our strict and liberal extensions are called prioritized and linear base revision,
respectively. Also, Nebel showed in [18] that deciding if a certain formula is
contained in the strict or in a liberal extension (that is, deciding α∼ β) is
PNP[O(log
c n)] and PNP[O(n)], respectively. We expect that these results carry
over to our framework.
6 Conclusion
We summarize our results in the following
Theorem 24 Let ∼ be a binary relation on L. Then the following are equiv-
alent:
1. ∼ is a rational inference relation, i.e. it satisfies Supraclassicality, Left
Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening, And, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity,
Or, and Rational Monotonicity.
2. ∼ is characterized by some rational relation ≤ on L using condition (C).
3. ∼ is defined by a ranked consequence operator.
Since rational orderings are in one-to-one correspondence with rational in-
ference, our first representation result has many ramifications. Results in belief
revision can be translated in a nonmonotonic framework and vice versa. For
instance, selection functions and preferential models can be used for the mod-
eling of both. Proofs of this results are straightforward through our defining
conditions for rational and expectation orderings. Work that has already been
done on expectation inference relations (e.g. the study of generating expecta-
tion inference relations through incomplete rational orderings—see [5]) can be
lifted smoothly to rational inference.
Our second representation result reveals the working mechanism of rational
inference. It shows that, in order to attain rational inference, we must prioritize
defaults in a particular way. We showed how default logic formalisms can fit
this pattern. It enables us to assign grades to all components of the reasoning
system (formulas and rules). Therefore, it is a particular attractive way to use
it as an inference mechanism for nonmonotonic reasoning.
The above characterization results reveal another notion of consequence
paradigm hidden behind nonmonotonicity. However, apart from Dubois and
Prade’s work on possibility logic, this paradigm has been passed largely un-
recognized by logicians as an appropriate method for a treatment of vagueness
and uncertainty. Yet, this paradigm arose independently from various studies
on different fields and appeared before nonmonotonic logic. In addition, it is
applicable. Now, an important question arises: how far this paradigm extends.
In other words, is it possible to reduce a nonmonotonic consequence relation
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to some relation expressing prioritization? The answer is positive and uniform.
The important case of preferential consequence relations is treated separately
in [8], while the general case (which includes cumulative consequence relations)
appears in [11].
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Gianni Amati and R. Ramanujam
for their helpful comments on a preliminary version of this paper.
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A Proofs
For the proof of Theorem 3, we shall make use of the following rules (derived in
any preferential inference relation).
Lemma 2 In any preferential inference relation, the following rules hold
1.
α∼ β β ∼ α α∼ γ
β ∼ γ
(Reciprocity)
2.
α ∧ β ∼ γ
α∼ β → γ
(S)
3.
α∼⊥
α ∧ β ∼⊥
4.
α ∧ β ∼⊥
α∼ ¬β
5.
α ∨ β ∼⊥
α∼⊥
Proof. Rules 1, 2 and 3 were introduced and showed to be derived in a preferen-
tial relation in [12]. For 4, suppose α ∧ β ∼⊥. Applying S, we get α∼ β → ⊥,
and, by Right weakening, we conclude 4. For 5, suppose α∨β ∼⊥. Then, by 3,
we get (α ∨ β) ∧ α∼⊥, and, by Left Logical Equivalence, we conclude 5.
Theorem 3 Let ∼ be a preferential inference relation based on ⊢. Then ∼
is a preferential inference relation based on ⊢′ that satisfies the Consistency
Preservation rule, where
α ⊢′ β iff Γ, α ⊢ β,
and
Γ = {¬γ : γ ∼⊥}.
Proof. We must prove that ∼ satisfies Supraclassicality, Left Logical Equiva-
lence, Right Weakening and Consistency Preservation with respect to ⊢′. The
rest of the properties are already satisfied since ∼ is a rational inference rela-
tion.
First notice that Consistency Preservation is immediate by definition of ⊢′.
For Supraclassicality, suppose α ⊢′ γ then Γ, α ⊢ γ. By compactness of ⊢,
there exists β1, . . . , βn ∈ L such that β1 ∼⊥, . . . , βn ∼⊥ and ¬β1, . . . ,¬βn, α∼ γ.
By repeated applications of Or, we get β1 ∨ · · · ∨ βn ∼⊥. Let β = β1 ∨ · · · ∨ βn,
then β ∼⊥ and α∧¬β ⊢ γ. By Supraclassicality of ∼ on ⊢ we have α∧¬β ∼ γ.
By Lemma 2.3, we have α ∧ β ∼⊥, so, by Lemma 2.4, we have α∼ ¬β. Using
Cut, we get α∼ γ.
For Left Logical Equivalence, suppose α∼ γ, α ⊢′ β and β ⊢′ α, i.e. Γ, α ⊢ β
and Γ, β ⊢ α. By compactness there exist δ1, δ2 ∈ L such that α∼¬δ1, α∼¬δ2,
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α ∧ δ1 ⊢ β and β ∧ δ2 ⊢ α. As above we have α∼ β and β ∼ α. Therefore by
Lemma 2.1 we get β ∼ γ.
Coming to Right Weakening, suppose α∼ β and β ⊢′ γ, i.e. there exists
δ ∈ L such that α∼ ¬δ and β ∧ ¬δ ∼ γ. By And we have α∼ β ∧ ¬δ, so using
Right Weakening of ∼ on ⊢ we get α∼ γ.
For Theorem 10, we shall need the following lemma.
Lemma 9 Let ≤ and ∼ be a rational ordering and inference relation, re-
spectively. Then
1. If α∼ ⊥ then β ≤′ ¬α, for all β ∈ L, where ≤′= O(∼ ).
2. If β ≤ ¬α, for all β ∈ L, then α∼ ′⊥, where ∼ ′ = C(≤).
3. ¬α < α→ γ iff {β : ¬α < β} ⊢ α→ γ.
4. If α∼ ′⊥ then β ≤ ¬α, for all β ∈ L, where ∼ ′ = C(≤).
5. If β ≤′ ¬α, for all β ∈ L, then α∼⊥, where ≤′= O(∼ ).
Proof. Part 2 is immediate from defining condition (C). For Part 1, suppose
that ¬(¬α ∧ β)∼ β. We must show ¬(¬α ∧ β)∼⊥. Since α∼⊥, we have
α∼ ¬β, by Right Weakening. Applying Or, we get α∨¬β ∼¬β. By hypothesis
and And, we get ¬(¬α ∧ β)∼⊥.
The left to right direction of Part 3 is straightforward. For the right to left
direction, suppose {β : ¬α < β} ⊢ α → γ. Then, by Compactness, there exist
β1, . . . , βn such that ¬α < βi, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βn ⊢ α→ γ.
By Conjunctiveness, we have ¬α < β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βn. So, by Dominance, we have
β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βn ≤ α→ γ. Hence, by Transitivity, ¬α < α→ γ, as desired.
For Part 4, we have, by definition of ∼ ′ that β ≤ ¬α, for all α ∈ L or there
is β ∈ L such that α ∧ β ⊢ ⊥ and ¬α < β. If the former holds then the result
follows immediately. If the latter holds then β ⊢ ¬α that contradicts ¬α < β,
by Dominance. Do Part 5
Lemma 25 Let ≤ and ∼ be a rational ordering and inference relation, respec-
tively. Then
1. ¬α ∨ ¬β ∼ ¬α implies α ≤′ β, where ≤′= O(∼ ).
2. α∼ ′β implies ¬α ∨ ¬β ≤ ¬α, where ∼ ′ = C(≤).
3. If ≤ satisfies Bounded Disjunction then ¬α ∨ ¬β ≤ ¬α implies α∼ ′β,
where ∼ ′ = C(≤).
Proof. For Part 1, if ¬α ∨ ¬β 6∼ α we get immediately α ≤′ β, by Definition
(O). If not, that is ¬α∨¬β ∼ α, then, by And and Right Monotonicity, we have
¬α ∨ ¬β ∼⊥. Again, by Definition (O), we have α ≤′ β.
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For Part 2, assume α∼ ′β. If α ⊢ β. Then we have ¬β ⊢ ¬α, so ¬α ∨ ¬β ⊢
¬α, and hence, by Dominance, ¬α ∨ ¬β ∼¬α, as desired. If not then there
must be γ ∈ L such that γ ⊢ α → β and negα < γ. Therefore ¬α < ¬α ∨ ¬β.
Now, suppose ¬α∨¬β 6≤ ¬α towards a contradiction. By Connectivity, we have
¬α < ¬α ∨ ¬β and so, by Conjunctiveness, ¬α < (α → β) ∨ (α → ¬β). Hence
¬α < ¬α, a contradiction to Reflexivity.
For Part 3, if ¬α < α → β then we immediately have α∼ ′β, by Definition
(C). If not, that is α → β ≤ ¬α, then applying Bounded Disjunction, we have
α∨ β ∨¬β ≤ ¬α. The latter implies ⊤ ≤ ¬α, so, by Dominance γ ≤ ¬α, for all
γ ∈ L. Hence α∼ ′β, by Definition (C).
Theorem 10 Given a rational ordering ≤ and a rational inference relation
∼ , then C(≤) is a rational inference relation and O(∼ ) is a rational ordering.
Moreover, we have ∼ = C(O(∼ )) and ≤= O(C(≤)).
Proof. We shall try not to overlap with the proof of Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson
proof of Theorem 6 (see proof of Theorem 3.3 in [7]). Therefore we do not cover
the case where the second half of condition (R∼ ) applies. The list of rules
we verify is Supraclassicality, Left Logical Equivalence, And, Cut, Cautious
Monotony, Or and Rational Monotony. Right Weakening follows from the above
list.
We shall first show that C(≤) is a rational inference relation.
For Supraclassicality, suppose that α ⊢ γ but not β ≤ ¬α for all β ∈ L. So
there exists β ∈ L such that ¬α < β. But then α ∧ β ⊢ γ and therefore α∼ γ.
For Left Logical Equivalence, suppose that α∼ γ, ⊢ α → β and δ ≤ ¬α for
all δ ∈ L. Since β ⊢ α we have ¬α ⊢ ¬β. By Dominance we get ¬α ≤ ¬β and
by Transitivity δ ≤ ¬β for all δ ∈ L. Therefore β ∼ γ.
For And, suppose that α∼ β and α∼ γ. In case δ ≤ ¬α for all δ ∈ L we
have immediately α∼ β ∧ γ.
Turning to Or, suppose that α∼ γ and β ∼ γ. If δ ≤ ¬α for all δ ∈ L and
δ ≤ ¬β for all δ ∈ L, then by Conjunctiveness we have either ¬α ≤ ¬α ∧ ¬β or
¬β ≤ ¬α∧¬β. In either case δ ≤ ¬α∧¬β for all δ ∈ L by Transitivity. Therefore
¬(α∨β)∼ γ. In the mixed case, say δ ≤ ¬α for all δ ∈ L and there exists δ0 ∈ L
such that β∧ δ0 ⊢ γ and ¬β < δ0, we have (α∨β)∧ (¬α∧ δ0) ⊢ γ. Now suppose
that ¬α ∧ δ0 < δ0. By Conjunctiveness we must have δ0 ≤ ¬α ≤ ¬α ∧ δ0, a
contradiction. Thus ¬(α ∨ β) ≤ β < δ0 ≤ ¬α ∧ δ0. Therefore α ∨ β ∼ γ.
For Cut, suppose that α∼ β and α∧ β ∼ γ. If δ ≤ ¬α for all δ ∈ L then, by
definition, α∼ γ. If not, there exists δ0 ∈ L such that α ∧ δ0 ⊢ β and ¬α < δ0.
Now suppose that δ ≤ ¬(α∧γ) for all δ ∈ L. Observe that α∧[(¬α∨¬β)∧δ0 ] ⊢ γ.
We moreover have that ¬α < δ0 ≤ (¬α ∨ ¬β) ∧ δ0. Therefore α∼ γ.
For Rational Monotonicity, suppose that α∼ γ and α 6∼ ¬β. If δ ≤ ¬α for
all δ ∈ L, then we get a contradiction because α∼¬β.
For Cautious Monotony, suppose that α∼ β and α∼ γ. Observe that in case
α 6∼ ¬β then the result follows by an application of Rational Monotony. If not,
i.e. α∼¬β, then by applying And we have α∼⊥. If δ ≤ ¬α for all δ, then,
since ¬α ⊢ ¬α ∨ ¬β, we have δ ≤ ¬α ≤ ¬α ∨ ¬β but ⊢ ¬α ∨ ¬β → ¬(α ∧ β)
therefore α ∧ β ∼ γ. Otherwise there exists δ such that α ∧ δ ⊢ ⊥ and ¬α < δ.
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But then we have that δ ⊢ ¬α and therefore δ ≤ ¬α which is a contradiction to
our hypothesis.
Definition (O) is identical to Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson’s one in the second
disjunct. Therefore we shall only treat the first disjunct.
For Dominance, suppose α ⊢ β and ¬(α∧β)∼ α. We have ¬β ⊢ ¬α and ¬α ⊢
¬α. By Or, we get ¬β∨¬α ⊢ ¬α. By Supraclassicality, we have ¬(α∧β)∼¬α.
Applying And, we get ¬(α ∧ β)∼⊥.
For Conjunctiveness, suppose ¬(α∧(α∧β)) ∼ α and ¬(β∧(α∧β)) ∼ β. These
imply ¬(α ∧ β)∼ α and ¬(α ∧ β)∼ β, by Left Logical Equivalence. Applying
And, we get ¬(α ∧ β)∼ α ∧ β. By reflexivity of ⊢ and And, we have ¬(α ∧
β)∼⊥. By Left Logical Equivalence again, we have ¬(α∧ (α∧ β))∼⊥, and so
¬(β ∧ (α ∧ β))∼⊥, as desired.
For Transitivity, let α ≤ β and β ≤ γ. Suppose ¬(α∧β)∼⊥. By Lemma 2.5,
we have ¬β ∼⊥. Lemma 2.3 gives ¬(β ∧ γ) ∧ ¬β ∼⊥. By S, we have ¬(β ∧
γ)∼ β. So, we have ¬(β ∧ γ)∼⊥. Using the initial hypothesis and Or, we get
¬α ∨ ¬β ∨ ¬γ ∼⊥. By Lemma 2.5, we have ¬α ∨ ¬γ ∼⊥, i.e. ¬(α ∧ γ)∼⊥.
Now, suppose ¬(β ∧ γ)∼⊥ and ¬(α ∧ γ 6∼ α. Then, by Lemma 2.5, we have
¬γ ∼⊥. Since ¬α∼¬α, we have ¬α∨¬γ ∼¬α. Therefore if ¬(α∧γ)∼ α, then
And gives ¬(α ∧ γ)∼⊥.
We shall now show that the initial rational inference relation ∼ and the
induced one ∼ ≤ by the expectation ordering with (C) are the same.
We show first that ∼ ⊆ ∼ ≤. Let α∼ γ. We must show that α∼ ≤γ.
If δ ≤ ¬α, for all δ ∈ L, then it clearly holds. If not, let β ≡ ¬α ∨ γ then
⊢ α ∧ β ↔ α ∧ γ. So α ∧ β ⊢ γ. Also, α ∨ ¬β ≡ α. If α∼⊥ then δ ≤ ¬α, for
all β ∈ L (using Lemma 9.1), so, by our hypothesis, α ∨ ¬β 6∼ ⊥. Observe that
α∨¬β ∼ γ, and γ ⊢ ¬α∨γ ≡ β. Right Weakening gives α∨¬β ∼ β. So β 6≤ ¬α
and therefore ¬α < β. Hence α∼ ≤γ.
For the other direction, i.e. ∼ ≤ ⊆ ∼ , let α∼ ≤γ. Suppose first that
β ≤ ¬α for all β ∈ L. Therefore ⊤ ≤ ¬α. This gives either ¬(¬α ∧ ⊥)∼⊥
or ¬(¬α ∧ ⊥) 6∼ ⊤. Since obviously the latter does not hold we must have that
α∼⊥ and hence, by Right Weakening, α∼ γ. Now suppose that there exists
β ∈ L with α ∧ β ⊢ γ and ¬α < β, i.e. β 6≤ ¬α. The latter implies that
α ∨ ¬β 6∼ ⊥ and α ∨ ¬β ∼ β. Observe that α ∧ β ≡ (α ∨ ¬β) ∧ β hence, by
Supraclassicality, (α ∨¬β) ∧ β ∼ γ. Applying Cut on the latter and α∨¬β ∼ β
we get α ∨ ¬β ∼ γ. Applying And on α ∨ ¬β ∼ β and α ∨ ¬β ∼ α ∨ ¬β we get
α ∨ ¬β ∼ α. Since α ∨ ¬β 6∼ ⊥ we have that α ∨ ¬β 6∼ ¬α. Applying Rational
Monotonicity on the latter and α ∨ ¬β ∼ γ we get (α ∨ ¬β) ∧ α∼ γ, i.e. α∼ γ.
It remains to show ≤= O(C(≤)). Let ≤′ be O(C(≤)) and assume α ≤′ β.
By definition of ≤, we have that ¬(α∧β)∼⊥ or ¬(α∧β) 6∼ α, where ∼ = C(≤).
The former implies γ ≤ α ∧ β, for all γ ∈ L, by Lemma 9. By Dominance and
Transitivity, we have α ≤ α ∧ β ≤ β, as desired. The latter implies that
¬(α ∧ β) → α ≤ α ∧ β. Since ¬(α ∧ β)→ α is (classically) equivalent to α, we
get α ≤ α ∧ β and so α ≤ β, by Dominance and Transitivity.
For the other direction, assume α ≤ β. If γ ≤ α ∧ β, for all γ ∈ L then
¬(α ∧ β)∼⊥, by Lemma 9.2, and therefore α ≤′ β, by Definition (O). If not
then, by Conjunctiveness on the hypothesis, we have α ≤ α ∧ β ≤ β. Since
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¬(α ∧ β) → α is (classically) equivalent to α, we get ¬(α ∧ β) → α ≤ α ∧ β.
So α ∧ β 6< ¬(α ∧ β) → α and so, by Definition (C) and Lemma 9.3, we have
¬(α ∧ β) 6∼ α. The latter implies, by Definition (O), α ≤′ β, as desired.
Proposition 16 A ranked consequence operator ∼ based on ⊢ is induced by
a chain of sets of formulas if and only if it is induced by the closure of this chain
under arbitrary unions and intersections.
Proof. Let ∼ and ∼ ′ be the ranked consequence operators induced by {Ai}i∈I
and {Aj}j∈J respectively, where the latter is the closure of the former under
arbitrary unions and intersections. Without loss of generality we can assume
that the sets belonging in {Ai}i∈I carry the same indices in {Aj}j∈J . We must
prove that ∼ is equal to ∼ ′.
From left to right, suppose ∼ β and there exists i ∈ I such that ∼ iβ. Since
i ∈ J we also have ∼ ′β. Suppose α∼ β. If α∼ iβ for some i ∈ i then as above
α∼ ′β. If ∼ i¬α for all i, i.e. ¬α ∈ Ai for all i, then ¬α ∈ Aj for all j ∈ J . For
either Aj =
⋃
k Aik or Aj =
⋂
k Aik , where ik ∈ I, and ¬α ∈ Aik for all k.
From right to left, suppose ∼ ′β, then there is j ∈ J such that ∼ jβ. Either
Aj =
⋃
k Aik or Aj =
⋂
k Aik , where ik ∈ I. In both cases there is some k0 such
that β ∈ Aik0 . Therefore ∼ β. Suppose now that α∼
′
β. If there exists j ∈ J
such that ¬α 6∈ Aj and α → β ∈ Aj then either Aj =
⋃
k Aik or Aj =
⋂
k Aik ,
where ik ∈ I. In the first case there exists k0 such that α → β ∈ Aik0 . We
also have that ¬α 6∈ Aik for all k. So for the same k0 we have that ¬α 6∈ Aik0 .
Therefore α∼ β. In the second case we have that α → β ∈ Aik for all k
while there exists k0 such that ¬α ∈ Aik0 . If ¬α ∈ Aj for all j ∈ J , then we
immediately have that ¬α ∈ Ai for all i ∈ I and hence α∼ β.
Proposition 19 An ordering induced by a ranked consequence operator is ra-
tional.
Proof. Let 〈{Bi}i∈I , ∼ 〉 be a ranked consequence operator. Denote O(∼ ) with
≤, and C(≤) with ∼ ≤.
We should verify that ≤ satisfies Supraclassicality, Transitivity, and Con-
junctiveness.
For Supraclassicality, suppose α ⊢ β. We have ⊢ α → β, so if Bi ⊢ α than
Bi ⊢ β, for all i ∈ I. Hence α ≤ β.
For Transitivity, suppose α ≤ β and β ≤ γ. Pick an i ∈ I such that Bi ⊢ α.
We have Bi ⊢ β, since α ≤ β. Hence Bi ⊢ γ, since β ≤ γ, as desired.
For Conjunctiveness, suppose α 6≤ α ∧ β and β 6≤ α ∧ β, towards a con-
tradiction. By our assumptions, there exist Bi and Bj with i, j ∈ J such that
Bi ⊢ α and Bi 6⊢ α ∧ β and Bj ⊢ β and Bj 6⊢ α ∧ β. Now, Bi’s form a chain
under inclusion, so either Bj ⊆ Bi, or Bi ⊆ Bj . If Bj ⊆ Bi then Bi ⊢ β, a
contradiction, since Bi ⊢ α and Bi 6⊢ α ∧ β. Similarly, for Bi ⊆ Bj.
We must now show that α∼ β iff α∼ ≤β. Assume α∼ β. We have either
∼ i¬α, for all i ∈ I, or there exists i ∈ I such that Bi 6⊢ ¬α and Bi ⊢ α → β.
Assume the former. We have immediately γ ≤ ¬α, for all γ ∈ L. Hence α∼ ≤,
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by Lemma 9.2. Assume the latter, then α → β 6≤ ¬α, that is, ¬α < α → β.
Hence α∼ β, by Lemma 9.3. The other direction is similar.
Corollary 20 A ranked consequence operator is a rational inference relation.
Proof. We shall give an alternative proof with a straightforward verification of
the rules of rational inference. We shall show that a ranked consequence operator
∼ based on ⊢ induced by a chain of sets {Bi}i∈I satisfies Supraclassicality, Left
Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening, And, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Or
and Rational Monotonicity.
For Supraclassicality, suppose α ⊢ β. We have either ∼ i¬α for all i ∈ I or
there exists some i ∈ I such that 6∼ i¬α. In the first case we have immediately
α∼ β. In the second case we have that Bi, α ⊢ β, by our hypothesis, and
therefore α∼ β.
For Left Logical Equivalence, suppose that ⊢ α ≡ β and α∼ γ. We have
either ∼ i¬α, i.e. Bi ⊢ ¬α, for all i ∈ I or there exists some i ∈ I such that
6∼ i¬α and Bi, α ⊢ γ. Since α and β are equivalent under ⊢, we have in the first
case that Bi ⊢ ¬β for all i ∈ I and In the second case that there exists some
i ∈ I such that 6∼ i¬β and Bi, β ⊢ γ. In both cases we have β ∼ γ.
For Right weakening, suppose α∼ β and ⊢ β → γ. If ∼ i¬α for all i ∈ I then
we immediately get α∼ γ. If there exists i ∈ I such that 6∼ i¬α and Bi, α ⊢ β
then we also have that Bi, α ⊢ β → γ by hypothesis. Therefore Bi, α ⊢ γ and
α∼ γ.
For And, suppose α∼ β and α∼ γ. If ∼ i¬α for all i ∈ I then we immedi-
ately have α∼ β ∧ γ. If not then there exists i, k ∈ I such that 6∼ i¬α, 6∼ k¬α,
Bi, α ⊢ β, and Bk, α ⊢ γ. Since ≤ is linear let i ≤ k. Then Bi ⊆ Bk and
therefore Bk, α ⊢ β. So Bk, α ⊢ β ∧ γ and α∼ β ∧ γ.
For Cut, suppose α∼ β and α ∧ β ∼ γ. If ∼ i¬α for all i ∈ I then we
immediately have α∼ γ. If not, then there exists i ∈ I such that 6∼ i¬α and
Bi, α ⊢ β. If ∼ j¬(α ∧ β)( ≡ ¬α ∨ ¬β) for all j ∈ I, then for i, Bi ⊢ ¬α ∨ ¬β,
i.e. Bi, α ⊢ ¬β. Combining with our hypothesis we get Bi ⊢ ¬α, i.e. ∼ i¬α, a
contradiction. Therefore there exists k ∈ I such that 6∼ k¬α∨¬β and Bk, α∧β ⊢
γ. There are two cases: either k ≤ i or i ≤ k. In the first case we have
Bi, α ∧ β ⊢ γ as well, so by (regular) cut on ⊢ and our hypothesis we get
Bi, α ⊢ γ. Therefore α∼ γ. In the second case, observe that Bk, α ⊢ β so as
above Bk, α ⊢ γ. Since Bk 6⊢ ¬α ∨ ¬β then Bk 6⊢ ¬α so again α∼ γ.
For Cautious Monotony, suppose α∼ β and α∼ γ. If ∼ i¬α for all i ∈ I then
we also have ∼ i¬α∨¬β hence ∼ i¬(α∧β) for all i ∈ I. Therefore α∧β ∼ γ. If
not, there exists i, k ∈ I such that 6∼ i¬α, Bi, α ⊢ β, 6∼ j¬α and Bj , α ⊢ γ. Let
l = max(i, k) then Bk 6⊢ ¬α and both Bl, α ⊢ β and Bl, α ⊢ γ. From the latter
we get Bl, α ∧ β ⊢ γ. Suppose that Bk ⊢ ¬α ∨ ¬β then Bl, α ⊢ ¬β. Combining
it with above we get Bl ⊢ ¬α which is a contradiction to our hypothesis.
For Or, suppose that α∼ γ and β ∼ γ. If both ∼ i¬α and ∼ i ⊢ ¬β for all
i ∈ I then we also have ∼ i¬α ∧ ¬β for all i and therefore α ∨ β ∼ γ. If this is
true for only one of them, say ∼ i¬α for all i ∈ I but there exists k ∈ I such
that 6∼ k¬β and Bk, β ⊢ γ, then we also have 6∼ k¬β∧¬α and Bk which implies
25
Bk, α ⊢ γ. So Bk, α ∨ β ⊢ γ and therefore α ∨ β ∼ γ. If neither of them holds
then there exist i, k ∈ I such that 6∼ i¬α, Bi, α ⊢ γ, 6∼ k¬β and Bk, β ⊢ γ. Let
l = max(i, k) then we have 6∼ l¬α∨¬β, Bl, α ⊢ γ and Bl, β ⊢ γ. So Bl, α∨β ⊢ γ
and therefore α ∨ β ∼ γ.
For Rational Monotonicity, suppose that α 6∼ ¬β and α∼ γ. We can’t have
∼ i¬α for all i ∈ I because we have that α 6∼ ¬β. So there exists i ∈ I such
that 6∼ i¬α and Bi, α ⊢ γ. We have by monotonicity of ⊢ that Bi, α ∧ β ⊢ γ.
Now observe that α 6∼ ¬β implies that if Bi, α ⊢ ¬β then ∼ i¬α. However since
6∼ i¬α we have that Bi, α 6⊢ ¬β so Bi 6⊢ ¬α ∨ ¬β. Therefore α ∧ β ∼ γ by
definition.
Theorem 21 A rational inference relation is a ranked consequence operator.
Proof. Denote the comparative rational inference relation by ∼ ≤. We shall
define a chain of sets {Ai}i∈I which generates a ranked consequence operator ∼
equal to ∼ ≤. Let ∼ be the equivalence relation induced by ≤ (an expectation
ordering is clearly a preorder). The equivalence classes will be denoted by αˆ
(where α ∈ αˆ). It is also clear that the set of equivalence classes is linearly
ordered. Now, for each α ∈ L, let
Aαˆ = {β : α ≤ β}.
Note here that, by Dominance, the sets Aαˆ are closed under consequence. More-
over, we have Aαˆ ⊆ Aβˆ iff β ≤ α. Now, generate a ranked consequence operator
∼ as in Definition 4.
We must show that ∼ and ∼ ≤ are identical.
Let α∼ ≤β, i.e. either β ≤ ¬α for all β ∈ L, or there exists δ ∈ L such that
¬α < δ and δ ∧ α ⊢ γ. In the first case ¬α ∈ A
βˆ
for all β ∈ L. So ∼
βˆ
¬α for
all β ∈ L and therefore α∼ γ. in the second case consider A
δˆ
. We have δ ∈ A
δˆ
so A
δˆ
, α ⊢ γ. Suppose that A
δˆ
⊢ ¬α then by compactness there exists δ′ ∈ A
δˆ
such that δ′ ⊢ ¬α. By Dominance we have δ′ ≤ ¬α and by definition of A
δˆ
,
δ ≤ δ′, i.e. δ ≤ ¬α, a contradiction.
Now let α∼ γ. If ∼
βˆ
¬α for all β ∈ L then β ≤ ¬α for all β ∈ L and we
are done. If not, then there exists δˆ such that A
δˆ
6⊢ ¬α and A
δˆ
, α ⊢ γ. Since
A
δˆ
6⊢ α we must have ¬α < δ. By compactness there exists δ′ ∈ A
δˆ
such that
δ′, α ⊢ γ, i.e. δ′ ∧ α ⊢ γ and ¬α < δ ≤ δ′. Therefore α∼ γ.
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